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Will a Guest Ever Be Able to Save Your Life?

Posted By Alex Cooper, Canadian Avalanche Association, March 25, 2020

From volume 91, winter 2009-10

By Manuel Genswein

 

 

1.INTRODUCTION
A variation of companion rescue is performed by clients of commercial guiding, off-piste and helicopter skiing organizations. The experience level of non-commercial back-country users is typically similar and their training level has primarily been achieved by their own motivation and sense of responsibility. Hence during an accident the level of competence amongst buried and non buried subjects is similar. In contrast, the level of responsibility, preparedness and training between clients and guides in commercial operations are hugely different.

 

By emphasizing “Safety,” some commercial operators create expectations that are difficult to fulfil in the context of ski touring, heliskiing or off-piste skiing. This does not help the clients’ mental preparedness for an accident. The motivation to train their clients is partly due to their own interest and partly due to laws concerning product liability. In countries with harsher product liability laws the training of clients is implemented more thorough than in countries where those laws barely exist. Another interesting fact is the diverging opinion among guides as to the usefulness of training their clients.


Some guides highly value a good base education also for their own good in order to be rescued. Others just hang an avalanche transceiver around the neck of their clients and have resigned themselves to never having a hope of being rescued by them. Because of the hopeless attitude of the latter group, typically their clients don’t get equipped with probe and shovel, which makes a rescue basically impossible. The combination of probe, shovel and transceiver—called “personal rescue equipment”—forms the base of an efficient rescue. This holds true even for commercial backcountry operators. In this context, the potentially rapid availability of rescue equipment—e.g. Helicopter aided companion rescue by heliski companies—is not enough of an excuse to fail in outfitting each client with their individual personal rescue equipment.

 

The topic of training and equipping clients appears especially important, if one considers that statistically it is the first person to enter a slope, that has clearly a higher probability to release an avalanche than subsequent persons.

 

2. HOW MUCH TRAINING IS REALISTIC AND ADEQUATE
Central to this discussion is the amount of time needed to adequately train the clients. The threshold for clients and guides is rather low compared to non-commercial groups, where education is a substantial part of the work for a guide.


After extensive enquiries with many commercial guiding, off-piste and helicopter skiing organizations (daily and weekly operators) in regards to an “acceptable” amount of time allocated for client training, the choice for an adequate and practicably possible time frame was 15 minutes. For those operators who have always valued fundamental training, this may appear quite short. For those guides that have “just hung the transceiver around the clients’ neck,” each minute appears to be too much. Ultimately the 15 minute time frame meets the requirement for “acceptance” and “usefulness.” Especially those who see the situation in a rather pessimistic light might put a little more importance into adequate training and personal rescue equipment for clients once they see the rather convincing test results.

 

Increasing client training time from 15 to 30 minutes would with great likelihood not significantly increase rescue efficiency. In the additional time no great advantages in search and rescue techniques are achieved. A valuable addition would be a short practice of a rescue scenario. Within the chosen time frame it is possible to learn search/ strategy for multiple burials by applying the “marking” feature.

 

The goal of this project and the field test is to design a training module for client training. After extensive enquiries with many commercial guiding, off-piste and helicopter skiing organizations (daily and weekly operators), the choice for an adequate and practicably possible time frame was 15 minutes. Immediately after the 15 minute training, the clients were asked to search for and excavate two buried subjects in a 50m x 80 m field. Based on the quantitative results of this test, conclusions as to the efficiency of the training module were made and the subsequent module was changed to optimize the content for the next group.


3. TEST PARTICIPANTS
All participants were clients of guides and ski instructors. For the field test the clients were separated from their guides. 83 clients participated in 14 groups. The clients‘ knowledge was varied; most were beginners. The average age was 53; 17 clients were older than 65. Guides were instructed not to hold any special lessons prior to the test. At the time of the test clients knew each other for a couple of hours up to a couple of days.

 

4. TEST ENVIRONMENT
4.1 Test fields
For efficient data recording, two test fields were used. They were 50m x 80m (see illustration 1), which represents the median size of “survived recreational avalanches” in Switzerland. Slope inclination was approximately 5 degrees in the lower third and up to 20 degrees in the upper end of the field.


Starting point for all rescuers was always a corner at the bottom end of the field (see illustration 1, triangle). In comparison with a typical off-piste avalanche accident this constitutes a significantly more difficult scenario. During an off-piste accident significantly more than 50 % of all rescues are conducted from the top. Foot penetration was between knee and hip deep. This cost the rescuers a significant amount of time and effort, as they were only allowed to move without skis.

 

Illustration 1

 

4.2 Buried Subjects
The “victims” were two bags normally used to carry firewood, sewn together and filled with straw. The approximate size per “victim” was 180cm x 70cm. When burying the victims, the snow was stomped down layer by layer. Burial depth was 50 cm – 100 cm, representing the average burial depth in off-piste avalanche accidents. The buried subjects were equipped with remote control avalanche transceivers with probe detection device. Two buried subjects were activated per search, combination A-A or B-B.

 

5. TEST PROCEDURE AND DATA RECORDING
All groups were lead to the site by their respective guides. Skis and other non-rescue specific gear was left behind. Guests received adequate probes and shovels. Only three-antenna avalanche transceivers with specific “marking” function to eliminate a previously located signal were used in this test. After the group arrived at the site they received a 15-minute instruction. After the short instruction participants were presented with the rescue scenario.

 

Details recorded:
● Signal search time: The time until the first signal is received.
● Coarse search time: The time from the first point of reception until the signal decreases for the first time as the rescuer walks over the buried subject.
● Fine search time: The time when a clear minimum of distance (or maximum of volume) can be isolated.
● Pinpoint search time: The time when the rescuer hits the buried subject with a probe.
● First visual contact with the buried subject

● Full body free

 

6. PRACTICAL TRAINING MODULE
The 15-minute training module included the following content:

● General goal and overview

Search procedure including “airport approach”

Mounting of the probe and shovel


● Basic handling of transceiver
“OFF – SEND – SEARCH.”. Switch SEND fg SEARCH two or three times on command, all together, repeat until a routine has been established. Verify after each step, if all participants were able to switched to the appropriate mode.


● Practical search with explanation of each search phase.
Practical search of one buried subject at 35 m distance. Transceiver angled at 45 degrees to group g curved search path, which forces attention on direction indication on transceiver. Flux lines / flux line characteristics not discussed. Clients follow with their transceiver on receive. Group is halted before next search phase to explain the next steps.


● Signal search
If distance to buried subject is greater than range of transceiver g signal search, as per diagram on back of transceiver, is necessary. 3D rotation until signal is detected. Move – no life has yet been saved by just standing still!


● Coarse search
Hold device horizontally “move in direction of arrow.” Does distance indication decrease or increase? At distance 10: airport in sight g slow down!

 

● Fine search
Approach g slowly and precisely, holding transceiver close to snow surface. Absolutely no grid search! Place shovel at the point of smallest distance indication.

 

● Pinpoint search with spiral probing (4) up until the “hit” at approximately 1.5 m burial depth. Leave probe in snow. “Mark” with marking function on transceiver; wait until all clients have marked. Activate second transceiver in 15m distance. All guest will locate the second transceiver on their own.


● Excavation
Short explanation of V-shaped snow conveyor. Put clients in V formation while teaching basic concept—“cut blocks” and central snow conveyor belt, paddling motion and correct handling of the avalanche shovel. Actively running of conveyor belt. Explanations and corrections while the clients work. Let conveyor belt run for 3 – 4 min. Practice rotation on command, no specific instructions as to behaviour when first contact with buried subject.

 

7. RESULTS

 

 14 groups of 83 clients reached the following median times for locating and completely excavating the buried subjects. Fastest and slowest times were measured as follows: The biggest time lag resulted between the completed excavation of the first buried subject and the start of the fine search for the second buried subject. Those rescuers who did not locate and mark the first buried subject themselves confessed often great difficulty in physically removing themselves from the first buried subject and moving towards the second buried subject, as the distance indication on their transceiver increased.


8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

 

 The field test results prove that very realistic survival chances exist within a commercially guided group if the guide is buried. The surprisingly short search times make it clear that short and efficient guest training makes sense. The common opinion that a guest cannot ensure the survival of the guide is hereby not accurate and has clearly been proven wrong.


Despite the short training time, the second buried subject was located and excavated in all scenarios. Clearly this result can be attributed to the technically advanced transceivers with marking function. Problems arose for the rescuers who did not mark the first buried subject while transitioning to locate the second buried subject. Those problems indicate that transceivers could further be improved. A basic requirement to achieve the above results is to always outfit clients with modern rescue equipment—probe, shovel and transceiver with “marking” function. The author recommends that instructors use the guidelines and techniques outlined in this paper when training their clients.


The full paper may be downloaded at www.genswein.com

Tags:  companion rescue  manuel genswein  rescue  ski guiding 

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Case Study: Skier Accidental Near Revelstoke Mountain Resort

Posted By Alex Cooper, Canadian Avalanche Association, November 6, 2019

From volume 104, fall 2013

By Troy Leahey

 

The start zone. Photo by Jim Bay.

 

This case study details a skier-triggered avalanche that occurred in the backcountry accessed from Revelstoke Mountain Resort (RMR) on February 22, 2013. The party included five young men, all new to Revelstoke. Three members of the party were involved in the avalanche. Two of these were partially buried; the deceased (an RMR staff member) was fully buried despite wearing an airbag. It was a size 2 slab avalanche with an approximately 40cm fracture line, which failed on an early February surface hoar layer.

 

Analyzing accidents has long been an important part of the CAA ITP program and in other risk  reduction industries. It is easy to be the armchair quarterback after an incident and identify the mistakes people made, but I believe it is also important to identify what was done well in the rescue effort to use as a good learning tool.

 

My involvement in this accident was on a number of different levels. As a member of Revelstoke Search and Rescue, I assisted Buck Corrigan and Ryan Buhler with the body recovery the day after the accident. I watched and helped interpret a Contour headcam video worn by one of the rescuers during the rescue effort for local members of the RCMP and a representative of the BC Coroners Service. This was a sobering but interesting piece of footage; although the actions of those involved on the scene would be apparent to most readers, the footage required some explanation and interpretation for non-skiing investigators. I interviewed some surviving members of the group for clarification on the location of those involved and their actions for the Coroners Service.

 

I also led a debrief at RMR for friends and co-workers of the deceased, including the other young men involved in the accident. This debrief was the most challenging public speaking exercise I have ever undertaken. Our company president asked if I could speak about the accident, as staff members and friends in the community had unanswered questions, and answers can help lead to understanding and closure. I wanted to be quite frank about the obvious mistakes made, as they were an opportunity for learning. I also wanted to commend the survivors on their effort and help them recover some confidence and dignity. I focused on the following points in the debrief.

 

This photo shows the position of the skiers when the avalanche occurred and where they ended up. Their uptrack is in red, the avalanche is outlined in black, and the blue dot is where the victim ended up. Photo by Troy Leahey.

 

MISTAKES:
• The most obvious mistake was the aggressive terrain choice—the danger rating at alpine and treeline was high. The five males were young, aggressive skiers with limited backcountry experience. This is the demographic we may expect to see on the avalanche fatality list. The deceased had skied in the terrain the day before and felt confident in his decision to lead the rest of the group to that zone. He had spent many days in this area in what had been a mostly stable season to that point. It was also the first major surface hoar cycle we had experienced in the season, and this type of avalanche failure may not have been familiar to a young German in Canada for his first winter. The CAC’s avalanche forecast was bang on—as it usually is—but youth, overconfidence and a desire to ski steep powder caused this glaring information to be ignored.

 

• Poor group management. The first three skiers on the uptrack were all involved in the avalanche; they were obviously not well spaced out enough and were all engulfed by the slab. Luckily the last two in the group were slower and not affected by the slab failure, and were able to execute a fairly quick rescue. Complacency on uptracks is a common problem for less experienced backcountry travellers. The group of five had been split into the first group of three up front and the slower pair at the back, which leads to a lack of communication and no consensus in the go or no-go decision. The most educated member of the group had been a student of mine on a CAA Avalanche Operations Level 1 course the previous year in Whistler. I spent a lot of time speaking with him about their decisions that day. He admitted to having reservations about the decisions being made, but did not speak up and deferred to the deceased as the leader, since he was most familiar with the terrain.

 

• Improper use of an avalanche balloon pack. Wear the crotch strap if you are wearing an airbag. The deceased was near the surface with his airbag inflated and clearly visible from 100m away. He had not attached the crotch strap of his airbag. As the overburden of the slab he triggered from mid-slope overran his position in the toe of the debris, the airbag was lifted away from his back and above his head. This caused two serious problems. As the balloons and pack were pushed forward and downhill it lifted the pack, causing the chest strap to catch on his chin and impede his airway. Secondly, the buoyant airbag also pulled the victim’s arms above his head, restricting movement and the ability to use hands to clear his own airway. The Contour video showed quite clearly the victim’s lifeless arms well above his head. The space between the balloon pack and the victim’s back was approximately 40-50cm.

 

The avalanche path where the victim was caught is on the right. Photo by Jim Bay.

 

WHAT THE RESCUERS DID WELL:

• The two not involved took a safe route to the toe of the debris and did not expose themselves to any additional hazard. They quickly and efficiently went into rescue mode when they saw the airbag on the surface, and began the excavation by first removing the pack and digging to the head to clear the airway.

 

• The two partial burials ended up mid-path and were able to self-rescue and do a transceiver search of the slide path down to the victim.

 

• Group members performed good first aid on the victim. Once they uncovered his head, they immediately cleared an ice chunk from his mouth and pulled him out to a prone position where they started CPR. Considering the environment, they performed excellent CPR with quality air movement as exhibited by the face of the victim in the video.

 

• The survivor with the most training took control of the rescue effort. He dispatched one of the members of the party to start moving back to the ski area boundary to report the accident as there was no cellular reception on the accident scene. This individual really led the first aid efforts as well.


• After at least a half hour of CPR, they made the decision to try to move the body with an improvised toboggan. They did not get very far as the conditions were very deep, but were able to move the body to a safe location out of the avalanche path. They then made the very difficult decision to leave the body and return to the ski area, as the weather conditions were deteriorating quickly. They left the body in a seated position under a tree with the inflated airbag and flagging tape arranged to mark its position, making our recovery very easy the next morning.

 

This was an unfortunate accident involving a group of nice young people from around the world enjoying the mountains in Revelstoke. There is nothing ground breaking about this accident other than the question of whether the airbag crotch strap could have made a difference. So why did I write this for The Avalanche Journal on a 30° July day when I’d rather be fishing? On a personal level, it brings back a bunch of vivid images and unpleasant emotions that make me sad. However, on the big-picture level this is an opportunity for others to learn and avoid mistakes in the future. A case study is really a story; this story may be repeated in Whistler, Banff or beyond. Hopefully the mistakes made and the triumphs that occurred in this accident will resonate and help others make better decisions in the mountains. That makes me happy.


Have a fun, safe winter.

Tags:  airbag  avalanche  avalanche journal  case study  companion rescue  fatal  revelstoke mountain resort  troy leahey 

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